Justification for military intervention in the Crimea a bit thin

From a Polish post on the situation in the Ukraine, an explanation on why there are so many Russian speakers in Crimea:

Stalin deportował większość Tatarów Krymskich, dokonując w ten sposób, czystki narodowościowej o cechach ludobójstwa. Następnie, osiedlał na Krymie głównie rosyjskich komunistów, tak jak Car swoich, tych najbardziej zasłużonych – potrzebujących ciepłego klimatu i wygód życia w po carskich kurortach.

ZSRR, podarowała Krym Ukrainie (za Chruszczowa), po śmierci Stalina, nieoficjalnie w zamian za ludobójstwo – jakiego się dopuściły władze komunistyczne na narodzie Ukraińskim (okres wielkiego głodu), a oficjalnie z wielkiej przyjaźni a tak naprawdę, dla konsolidacji obu narodów w nowy twór państwowy, którą to przyjaźń, na naszych oczach, teraz Rosja szybko marnotrawi.

Now the translation using Google Translate. Unfortunately, my Polish is not good enough for me to translate this properly myself.

Stalin deported the majority of Crimean Tatars, making in this way, the ethnic cleansing of the characteristics of genocide. Then, settled mainly in the Crimea Russian Communists, like their car, the most deserving - in need of a warm climate and the comforts of life in the tsarist resorts.

USSR gave Crimea, Ukraine (Khrushchev), after the death of Stalin, unofficially, in exchange for genocide - which is committed to the communist nation Ukrainian (famine period), and officially with great friendship and really, for the consolidation of the two nations in the new creation state, which is friendship, in our eyes, now Russia quickly wasted.

What I find interesting is that it is not that difficult to find out that Crimea was full of Tartars prior to the Soviet Union's double purge of the local population; first by starvation during the period 1917-33, and then mass deportation to remove the population completely in 1944. Yet, this very recent history of the region is not really mentioned in many of the numerous news reports that we are getting. Instead, the justification for Russia taking back Crimea seems to be because it contains a majority of Russian speakers, and that there is some sort of Russian naval base there.

Well, that line of reasoning is kinda dangerous, I think.

Not that I think that Muslim slave traders (albeit in the past) are the best sort of neighbours.

However, it will not end in Crimea. As this writer of the New Republic says, Russia is suffering from phantom limb syndrome, seeking to consciously or unconsciously recreate the old empire. Made easier by how the previous satellite states are comprised:

The internal issues of former Soviet republics, you see, are not truly internal issues of sovereign nations. This is because, by Stalin's very conscious design and very deliberate border drawing and population movement, most former Soviet republics are ethnic hodgepodges. So Ukraine has a sizable Russian population. Ditto Estonia, ditto Georgia, ditto Kazakhstan. And, according to Putin's unspoken doctrine, anywhere Russian citizens are determined to be at risk, Mother Moscow can intercede with force on their behalf.

In other, blunter words, Russian ethnicity and citizenship trump national sovereignty. At the very least, they provide a convenient pretext for territorial expansion, as they did in South Ossetia and Abkhazia, where Russia was also ostensibly protecting Russian citizens—also newly minted for the occasion. Just this week, for instance, Russia introduced a law to make it easier for Ukrainians to get Russian citizenship—you know, to give Russia someone to protect.

Russia manufactured this crisis to create a pretext for a land-grab. There are now protests swinging Russian flags and hailing Russia's glory not just in Crimea but all over the Russian-speaking east of Ukraine. I was just in Donetsk, Yanukovich's hometown, on Monday. It was calm, calmer than calm. There were a couple dozen people guarding the Lenin statue in the center of the city from vandals, but that was it. A muckety-muck in the city's administration told me, "If they send new people in to replace us, we'll leave peacefully, we won't try to hang on." The same was the case in Simferopol, in Crimea. And then, out of nowhere, men with unmarked uniforms were taking over government buildings and airports, and huge demonstrations were pumping on town squares all over the regions. The Kremlin often refers to "a well-organized informational war" when their enemies broadcast something they don't like on repeat. And now, looking at the alarmist, blanket coverage on Russian television—now all loyal to the Kremlin—about fascists and radicals staging a coup in Kiev, it's hard to think of a better term. This was indeed a well-organized informational war.

Is all of this justified? I suppose it depends on which side you are on.